# 金融工程作业代写Financial Engineering代考

0

## 代写金融工程作业代写Financial Engineering

### 计算金融代写

• 金融经济学Financial economics
• 金融创新Financial innovation
• 资产负债表Balance sheet

## 金融工程的教育史

The first Master of Financial Engineering degree programs were set up in the early 1990s. The number and size of programs has grown rapidly, to the extent that some now use the term “financial engineer” to refer to a graduate in the field. The financial engineering program at New York University Polytechnic School of Engineering was the first curriculum to be certified by the International Association of Financial Engineers. The number, and variation, of these programs has grown over the decades subsequent (see Master of Quantitative Finance § History); and lately includes undergraduate study, as well as designations such as the Certificate in Quantitative Finance.

## 金融工程Financial Engineering 课后作业代写

many possible regulations can be contemplated that, in retrospect, could have prevented the crisis.

Finally, the bankers were not compelled to take advantage of the low risk weights of highly rated ABS tranches, nor to prefer mortgage bonds to other highly rated ABS. Had they known they were buying into a mortgage bubble, they could have absorbed the penalties established by the Recourse Rule for investing in commercial loans or corporate securities rather than highly rated $A B S$ : those penalties would have been less severe than the penalties exacted by the financial crisis. But as we saw in Chapter 1 , the evidence suggests that they did not know. The failure to anticipate the mortgage bubble was shared by banker and regulator alike. Nonetheless, it does seem that the unintended effect of the Recourse Rule was to push commercial banks to load up on highly rated mortgage bonds, and thus to have caused the financial crisis when the bubble burst.

However, Table $2.3$ leaves us with a puzzle. Given that the Recourse Rule steered U.S. banks toward the senior tranches of PLMBS and CDOs (just as Basel II would have done, where it was being enforced), the net effect of tripling commercial banks’ exposure to these securities was to concentrate a mere $4.3$ percent of their assets in what turned out to be dangerous instruments. How did this $4.3$ percent cause such a huge banking crisis?