Assignment-daixieTM为您提供利物浦大学University of Liverpool ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS ECON342进阶微观经济学代写代考和辅导服务！
Instructions:
Advanced microeconomics is a branch of economics that deals with the behavior of individuals, firms, and markets. It builds upon the principles of microeconomics and incorporates more complex theoretical and mathematical models to analyze the decisions made by economic agents in various situations.
Advanced microeconomics covers topics such as game theory, asymmetric information, general equilibrium theory, welfare economics, and mechanism design. It also involves the study of topics like consumer behavior, producer behavior, market structure, and competition.
Advanced microeconomics is important because it provides a deeper understanding of economic phenomena, helps to identify potential inefficiencies in markets, and guides the design of policies to improve economic outcomes. It is used in many fields, including finance, business, public policy, and academia.
)Give a formal definition of what it means for a multistage game with observed
actions to be continuous at infinity? Why do we care whether games are continuous at
infinity?
See the lecture notes or FT for the formal definition. We care about continuity at infinity because if this property is satisfied, then checking a proposed SPE is equivalent to checking the single-deviationproperty (ie that no player can achieve a higher payoff by deviating from their equilibrium strategy at a single node, and playing according to their equilibrium strategy at all other nodes).
State Kakutani’s theorem. What correspondence is it applied to in the proof that
any finite game has a Nash equilibrium? Where does the argument break down if you try
to use Kakutani’s theorem in the same way to prove the existence of an equilibrium in the
”Name the Largest Number” game?
See the notes for the definitions. The assumption that breaks down in the “name the largest
number” game is that C, the space of strategy profiles, is not compact (because there is no limit on how
large the numbers named by the players can be).
Given an example of a game in which you could argue that the subgame perfect
equilibrium concept is too restrictive and rules out a reasonable outcome. Give an example
of a game in which you could argue that the subgame perfect equilibrium concept is not
restrictive enough and fails to rule out an unreasonable outcome. (Explain briefly what
you would argue about each example.)
The centipede game that Glenn discussed in class is an example where SPE/backward induction
rules out a reasonable outcome. If you remember, the SPE is to play down immediately, giving the players a
low payoff. But it is probably more reasonable from an empirical point of view to expect players to cooperate
for a while before they play down.
An example where SPE gives an unreasonable result – Glenn gives several of these in the notes. He
discusses games in which SPE allows equilibria that involve players choosing actions at an information set
that are inconsistent with any possible set of beliefs the player could hold at that information set. Signalling
games will often have unreasonable SPE, because there are no subgames (you can’t separate parts of the
game tree without cutting information sets).
